



Chair for Network Architectures and Services
Department of Informatics
TU München – Prof. Carle

Network Security

IN2101

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Chapter 12

System Vulnerabilities and Denial of Service Attacks




System Vulnerabilities and Denial of Service Attacks

- ❑ Introduction and Threat Overview
- ❑ Denial of Service Threats
- ❑ DoS Attacks: Classification
- ❑ System Vulnerabilities
- ❑ Honeypots
- ❑ Upcoming Challenges



A High Level Model for Internet-Based IT-Infrastructure





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Denial of Service

- ❑ What is Denial of Service?
 - *Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim at denying or degrading legitimate users' access to a service or network resource, or at bringing down the servers offering such services*
- ❑ Motivations for launching DoS attacks:
 - Hacking (just for fun, by "script kiddies", ...)
 - Gaining information leap (→ 1997 attack on bureau of labor statistics server; was possibly launched as unemployment information has implications to the stock market)
 - Discrediting an organization operating a system (i.e. web server)
 - Revenge (personal, against a company, ...)
 - Political reasons ("information warfare")
 - ...





Denial of Service Attacking Techniques

- ❑ *Resource destruction* (disabling services):
 - Hacking into systems
 - Making use of implementation weaknesses as buffer overflow
 - Deviation from proper protocol execution
- ❑ *Resource depletion* by causing:
 - Storage of (useless) state information
 - High traffic load (requires high overall bandwidth from attacker)
 - Expensive computations (“expensive cryptography”!)
 - Resource reservations that are never used (e.g. bandwidth)
- ❑ Origin of malicious traffic:
 - Genuineness of source addresses: either genuine or forged
 - Number of sources:
 - single source, or
 - multiple sources (*Distributed DoS, DDoS*)



Examples: Resource Destruction


- ❑ Ping-of-Death:
 - Maximum size of TCP/IP packet is 65536 bytes
 - Oversized packet may crash, freeze, reboot system
- ❑ Teardrop:
 - Fragmented packets are reassembled using the Offset field.
 - Overlapping Offset fields might cause system to crash.






Resource Depletion Example 1: Abusing ICMP

- ❑ Two main reasons make ICMP particular interesting for attackers:
 - It may be addressed to broadcast addresses
 - Routers respond to it
- ❑ The *Smurf* attack - ICMP echo request to broadcast:
 - An attacker sends an ICMP echo request to a broadcast address with the source address forged to refer to the victim
 - local broadcast: 255.255.255.255;
 - directed broadcast: (191.128.0.0/24) 191.128.0.255
 - Routers (often) allow ICMP echo requests to broadcast addresses
 - All devices in the addressed network respond to the packet
 - The victim is flooded with replies to the echo request
 - With this technique, the network being abused as an (unaware) attack amplifier is also called a *reflector network*:



Resource Depletion Example 2: TCP-SYN Flood

- ❑ Category *Storage of useless state information*:
 - Here: TCP-SYN flood attack




—→ TCP SYN packets with forged source addresses ("SYN Flood")

- - -→ TCP SYN ACK packet to assumed initiator ("Backscatter")




Resource Depletion with Distributed DoS (1)



- ❑ Category *Overwhelming the victim with traffic*
- ❑ Attacker intrudes multiple systems by exploiting known flaws
- ❑ Attacker installs DoS-software:
 - „Root Kits“ are used to hide the existence of this software
- ❑ DoS-software is used for:
 - Exchange of control commands
 - Launching an attack
 - Coordinating the attack



Resource Depletion with Distributed DoS (2)




- ❑ The attacker classifies the compromised systems in:
 - Master systems
 - Slave systems
- ❑ Master systems:
 - Receive command data from attacker
 - Control the slaves
- ❑ Slave systems:
 - Launch the proper attack against the victim
- ❑ During the attack there is no traffic from the attacker

-----> Control Traffic —————> Attack Traffic



Resource Depletion with Distributed DoS (3)


□ Different Attack Network Topologies



Resource Depletion with CPU Exhaustion

□ Category *CPU exhaustion by causing expensive computations:*

- Here: attacking with bogus authentication attempts



- The attacker usually either needs to receive or guess some values of the second message, that have to be included in the third message for the attack to be successful
- Also, the attacker, must trick the victim *repeatedly* to perform the expensive computation in order to cause significant damage

➡ Be aware of DoS-Risks when introducing security functions into protocols!!!



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- ❑ **DoS Attacks: Classification**
- ❑ System Vulnerabilities
- ❑ Honeypots
- ❑ Upcoming Challenges



DoS Attacks: Classification

- ❑ Classification by exploited vulnerability
 - Software vulnerability attacks
 - Protocol attacks
 - Brute-Force / flooding attacks
- ❑ Classification by attack rate dynamics:
 - Continues rate
 - Variable rate:
 - Increasing
 - Fluctuating
- ❑ Classification by impact:
 - Disruptive
 - Degrading



Classification of DoS Attacks by Exploited Vulnerability (1)

- ❑ Based on the vulnerability that is targeted during an attack, DoS attacks can be classified into:
 - Software vulnerability attacks
 - Protocol attacks
 - Brute-Force / flooding attacks
- ❑ Some attacks can be classified into more than one of these categories. (see below)
- ❑ Software vulnerability attacks:
 - Here, software bugs are exploited.
 - Examples:
 - Cisco 7xx attack: Some Cisco 7xx routers were crashed by connecting with "Telnet" and typing a very long password
⇒ a password buffer overflow.
 - Ping-of-Death
 - Teardrop



Classification of DoS Attacks by Exploited Vulnerability (2)

- ❑ Protocol Attacks
 - Exploits a specific feature or implementation bug of the protocol.
 - Examples include:
 - TCP SYN flood attacks
 - Authentication server attacks
 - Ping-of-death
 - Teardrop
- ❑ Brute-force Attacks / Flooding attacks:
 - The victim is overwhelmed with a vast amount of seemingly legitimate transactions.
 - Brute-force attacks are further classified into two sub-categories: (see also next slide for more details)
 - Filterable attacks
 - Non-filterable attacks



Classification of DoS Attacks by Exploited Vulnerability (3)

- ❑ Filterable attacks:
 - The flood packets are not critical for the service offered by the victim, and therefore can be filtered.
 - Example: UDP flood or ICMP request flood on a web server.
- ❑ Non-filterable attacks:
 - The flood packets request legitimate services from the victim.
 - Examples include:
 - HTTP request flood targeting a Web server
 - CGI request flood
 - DNS request flood targeting a name server
 - Filtering all the packets would be an immediate DoS attack to both attackers and legitimate users.
- ❑ The victim might mitigate the effect of protocol attacks, by modifying the deployed protocol.
- ❑ However, the victim is helpless against brute-force attacks if they use legitimate services.



Classification of DoS Attacks by Attack Rate Dynamics

- ❑ Based on the attack rate dynamics that is targeted during an attack, DoS attacks can be classified into:
 - Continuous Rate Attacks
 - Variable Rate Attacks
- ❑ Continuous Rate Attacks:
 - The most frequent kind of attack
 - When the attack is launched, agent machines generate attack packets with a large constant rate.
 - The sudden packet flood disrupts the victim's services quickly.
 - The attack may be noticed quickly.
- ❑ Variable Rate Attacks:
 - Vary the attack rate to avoid detection
 - The attack rate might be increasing over a long time or even fluctuating, which makes detection even harder.



Classification by Impact

- ❑ Disruptive:
 - The goal is to fully deny the victim's service to its clients
 - The most common category of attacks
- ❑ Degrading:
 - A portion of the victim's resources (e.g. 30%) are occupied by the attackers.
 - Can remain undetected for a signification time period
 - Customers experience slow response times or now service during high load periods.
 - Customers go to an other Service Provider.



System Vulnerabilities: Basic Attacking Styles

- ❑ Origin of attacks:
 - Remote attacks: attacker breaks into a machine connected to same network, usually through flaw in software
 - Local attacks: malicious user gains additional privileges on a machine (usually administrative)
- ❑ Main attacking techniques:
 - *Buffer overflow:*
 - Intentional manipulation of program state by causing an area of memory to be written beyond its allocated limits
 - *Race condition:*
 - Exploiting non-atomic execution of a series of commands by inserting actions that were "unforeseen" by the programmer
 - *Exploiting trust in program input / environment:*
 - It is often possible to maliciously craft input / environment variables to have deleterious side effects
 - Programmers are often unaware of this



Identifying Vulnerable Systems with Port Scans (1)

- ❑ Background
 - Identification of vulnerable systems / applications in order to identify systems to compromise
 - Automated distribution of worms
- ❑ Scan types
 - Vertical scan: sequential or random scan of multiple (5 or more) ports of a single IP address from the same source during a one hour period
 - Horizontal scan: scan of several machines (5 or more) in a subnet at the same target port from the same source during a one hour period
 - Coordinated scan: scans from multiple sources (5 or more) aimed at a particular port of destinations in the same /24 subnet within a one hour window; also called distributed scan
 - Stealth scan: horizontal or vertical scans initiated with a very low frequency to avoid detection



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Honeypots (1)

- ❑ A *Honeypot* is a resource, which pretends to be an attacked or compromised real target, but is a redundant or isolated resource where the attacker can not do any real damage.
- ❑ Motivation
 - *Get to know the “enemy”!!*
- ❑ Low-Interaction Honeypots:
 - Emulated services (e.g. FTP) and emulated operations systems
 - Easier to deploy and maintain
 - Can log only limited information
 - Limited capture of activities
- ❑ High-Interaction Honeypots
 - Involves real operation systems and real applications
 - Can capture extensive amount of information
 - Problem: Attackers can use this real operating system to attack non-honeypot systems.



Honeypots (2)

- ❑ Honeypots can capture unknown attacks.
- ❑ Honeypots can slow down or even stop the spread of worms.
 - Worms scan for vulnerabilities, and take over the system.
 - A honeypot can slow the scanning capabilities of the worm and eventually stop it.
 - scan unused IP spaces
 - TCP window size is zero.
- ❑ Real systems can not be taken offline for analysis.
 - They are often too critical.
 - They contain too much data pollution involved such as it is difficult to determine what the attacker actually did.
- ❑ Honeypots can quickly and easily be taken offline for a full forensic analysis.
- ❑ High-interaction honeypots are a very effective solution to prevent intrusion.
- ❑ They provide in-depth knowledge about the behavior of attackers.



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Some Upcoming Challenges

- ❑ The introduction of Internet protocols in classical and mobile telecommunication networks also introduces the Internet's DoS vulnerabilities to these networks
- ❑ Programmable end-devices (PDAs, smart phones) may constitute a large base of possible slave nodes for DDoS attacks on mobile networks
- ❑ Software defined radio implementation may even allow new attacking techniques:
 - Hacked smart phones answer to arbitrary paging requests
 - Unfair / malicious MAC protocol behavior
 - ...
- ❑ The ongoing integration of communications and automation (→ sensor/actuator networks) may enable completely new DoS threats