

Chair for Network Architectures and Services Department of Informatics TU München – Prof. Carle

Network Security IN2101

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Oral Examinations

Proposed dates

- □ Monday 16.2., 16:00-18:00
- □ Thursday 19.2., 14:00-18:00
- □ Thursday 19.3., 14:00-18:00
- □ Thursday 23.4., 13:30-15:00

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
Chapter 11 Middleboxes



Overview

Introduction

- □ Firewalls
- Application Proxies
- Networks Address Translators (NAT)
- Virtual Private Networks
- Case study: Linux Netfilter





Introduction to Network Firewalls (2)

- What firewalls can do:
 - A firewall is a focus for security decisions
 - A firewall can enforce a security policy, i.e. concerning access control
 - A firewall can log Internet activity efficiently
 - A firewall can block unwanted traffic if the traffic can be characterized,
 - e.g. with an IP 5-tuple: IP source address, IP destination address, source port number, destination port number, transport protocol
 - A firewall can limit exposure to security problems in one part of a network



Introduction to Network Firewalls (3)

- What firewalls can not do:
 - A firewall can't protect against malicious insiders
 - A firewall can't protect against connections that don't go through it
 - A firewall can't protect against completely new threats
 - A firewall can't fully protect against viruses,
 - e.g. if viruses are spread through emails, and the email service is allowed through the firewall, which is typically the case
 - A firewall does not perform cryptographic operations, e.g. message authentication

(however, firewalls are often co-located with VPN end-points)

A firewall can't set itself up correctly (⇒ cost of operation)

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Protocol Fields Important for Firewalls (1)

Access Protocol:

- Network Layer Protocol: IP, Appletalk, IPX (Novell), DecNet, etc. (Note: among these protocols nowadays, IP is nearly the only protocol that is being deployed)
- Access Protocol Addresses: Ethernet MAC Address, E.164 Address, etc.
 - These addresses either refers to the final source / destination or the addresses
 of the intermediate nodes of this link
- IP:
 - Source address
 - Destination address
 - Flags, especially the indication of an IP fragment
 - Transport protocol type: TCP, UDP, ICMP, ...
 - Options:
 - E.g. source routing:
 - the sender explicitly specifies the route an IP packet will take
 - as this is often used for attacks most firewalls discard these packets
 - In general, IP options are rarely used

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Protocol Fields Important for Firewalls (2)

□ TCP:

- Source Port, Destination Port:
 - Evaluation of source and destination ports allow to determine (with a limited degree of confidence) the sending / receiving application, as most Internet services use well-known port numbers
- Control:

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- ACK: this bit is set in every segment but the very first one transmitted in a TCP connection, it therefore helps to identify connection requests
- SYN: this bit is only set in the first two segments of a connection, so it can be used to identify connection confirmations
- RST: if set this bit indicates an ungraceful close of a connection, it can be used to shut peers up without returning helpful error messages
- Application Protocol:
 - In some cases a firewall might even need to peek into application protocol header fields
 - However, examination of application layer payloads is usually left to application proxies that are aware of the type of the application

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Two Fundamental Approaches Regarding Firewall Policy

- Default deny strategy:
 - "Everything that is not explicitly permitted is denied"
 - Examine the services the users of the protected network need
 - Consider the security implications of these services and how the services can be safely provided
 - Allow only those services that can be safely provided and for which there is a legitimate need
 - Deny any other service
- Default permit strategy:
 - "Everything that is not explicitly forbidden is permitted"
 - Permit every service that is not considered dangerous
 - Example:
 - Network file system (NFS) and X-Windows is not permitted across the firewall
 - · Incoming telnet connections are only allowed to one specific host
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What Internet Services & Protocols should be Considered?

- Electronic mail: simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP)
- □ File exchange: file transfer protocol (FTP), network file system (NFS)
- □ Remote terminal access and command execution: telnet, rlogin, ssh
- Usenet news: network news transfer protocol (NNTP)
- World wide web: hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP)
- Information about people: finger
- Real-time conferencing services: CUseeMe, Netmeeting, Netscape conference, MBone tools, ...
- Name services: domain name service (DNS)
- Network management: simple network management protocol (SNMP)
- Time service: network time protocol (NTP)
- Window systems: X-Windows
- Printing systems: line printing protocols (LPR/LPD)


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Firewall Terminology & Building Blocks for Firewalls

- Firewall:
 - A component or a set of components that restricts access between a protected network and the Internet or between other sets of networks
- Packet Filtering:
 - The action a device takes to selectively control the flow of data to and from a network
 - Packet filtering is an important technique to implement access control on the subnetwork-level for packet oriented networks, e.g. the Internet
- De-militarized zone (DMZ) :
 - A subnetwork added between an external and an internal network, in order to provide an additional layer of security; also called **perimeter network**
- Bastion Host:
 - A computer that must be highly secured because it is more vulnerable to attacks than other hosts on a subnetwork
 - A bastion host in a firewall is usually the main point of contact for user processes of hosts of internal networks with processes of external hosts


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Firewall Architectures (1)



- The most simple architecture just consists of a packet filtering router
- □ It can be either realized with:
 - A standard workstation (e.g. Linux PC) with at least two network interfaces plus routing and filtering software
 - A dedicated router device, which usually also offers filtering capabilities

Firewall Architectures (2)



- It has at least two network interfaces
- Drawback: As all permitted traffic passes through the bastion host, this may introduce a performance bottleneck


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
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Firewall Architectures (3)




- The packet filter:
 - Allows permitted IP traffic between screened host and the Internet
 - Blocks direct traffic between other internal hosts and the Internet
- □ The screened host provides proxy services:
 - The screened host acts as a bastion host, being partially protected by the packet filter

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- A DMZ is created between two packet filters
- The inner packet filter serves for additional protection in case the bastion host is compromised:
 - This avoids a compromised bastion host to sniff internal traffic
- □ The DMZ (i.e., perimeter network) is also a good place to host a publicly accessible information server, e.g. a www-server

Firewall Architectures (5)



- A dual-homed bastion host splits the perimeter network in two distinct networks
- This provides defense in depth, as:
 - The dual-homed bastion host provides finer control on the connections as his proxy services are able to interpret application protocols
 - The bastion host is protected from external hosts by an outer packet filter
 - The internal hosts are protected from the bastion host by an inner packet filter

Packet Filtering (1)

- What can be done with packet filtering?
 - Theoretically speaking everything, as all information exchanged in a communication relation is transported via packets
 - In practice, however, the following observations serve as a guide:
 - Operations that require quite detailed knowledge of higher layer protocols or are easier to realize in proxy systems
 - Operations that are simple but need to be done fast and on individual packets are easier to do in packet filtering systems
- Basic packet filtering enables to control data transfer based on:
 - Source IP Address
 - Destination IP Address
 - Transport protocol
 - Source and destination application port
 - Specific protocol flags (e.g. TCP's ACK- and SYN-flag)
 - The network interface a packet has been received on

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Packet Filtering (2)

- More elaborate packet filtering:
 - Stateful or dynamic packet filtering:
 - Example 1: "Let incoming UDP packets through only if they are responses to outgoing UDP packets that have been observed"
 - Example 2: "Accept TCP packets with the SYN bit set only as part of TCP connection initiation"
 - Protocol checking:
 - Example 1: "Let in packets bound for the DNS port, but only if they are formatted like DNS packets"
 - Example 2: "Do not allow HTTP transfers to these sites"
 - However, more elaborate packet filtering consumes more resources!
- Actions of a packet filter:
 - Pass the packet
 - Drop the packet
 - Eventually, log the passed or dropped packet (entirely or parts of it)
 - Eventually, pass an error message to the sender (may help an attacker!)

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Packet Filtering

- Specifying packet filtering rules:
 - As a packet filter protects one part of a network from another one, there is an implicit notion of the direction of traffic flow:
 - Inbound: The traffic is coming from an interface which is outside the protected network and its destination can be reached on an interface which is connected to the protected network
 - Outbound: the opposite of inbound
 - For every packet filtering rule this direction is specified as either "inbound", "outbound", or "either"
 - Source and destination address specifications can make use of wildcards, e.g. 125.26.*.* denotes all addresses starting with 125.26.
 - In our examples, we denote often simply denote addresses as "internal" or "external" when we want to leave exact network topology out of account
 - For source and destination ports we sometimes write ranges, e.g. ">1023"
 - We assume filtering rules to be applied in the order of specification, that means the first rule that matches a packet is applied

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An Example Packet Filtering Ruleset (1)

Rule	Direction	Src. Addr.	Dest. Addr.	Protocol	Src. Port	Dest. Port	ACK	Action
Α	Inbound	External	Internal	ТСР		25		Permit
В	Outbound	Internal	External	TCP		>1023		Permit
С	Outbound	Internal	External	TCP		25		Permit
D	Inbound	External	Internal	ТСР		>1023		Permit
Е	Either	Any	Any	Any		Any		Deny

- This ruleset 1 aims to specify that incoming and outgoing email should be the only allowed traffic into and out of a protected network
- Email is relayed between two servers by transferring it to an SMTPdaemon on the target server (server port 25, client port > 1023)
- Rule A allows incoming email to enter the network and rule B allows the acknowledgements to exit the network
- Rules C and D are analogous for outgoing email
- Rule E denies all other traffic

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An Example Packet Filtering Ruleset (2)

- Consider, for example, a packet which "wants" to enter the protected subnet and has a *spoofed* IP source address from the internal network:
 - As all allowed inbound packets must have external source and internal destination addresses (A, D) this packet is successfully blocked
 - The same holds for outbound packets with external source addresses (B, C)
- Consider now telnet traffic:
 - As a telnet server resides usually at port 23, and all allowed inbound traffic must be either to port 25 or to a port number > 1023, incoming packets to initiate an incoming telnet connection are successfully blocked
 - The same holds for outgoing telnet connections
- However, the ruleset is flawed as, for example, it does not block the X11-protocol for remote operation of X-Windows applications:
 - An X11-server usually listens at port 6000, clients use port numbers > 1023
 - Thus, an incoming X11-request is not blocked (D), neither is any answer (B)
 - This is highly undesirable, as the X11-protocol offers many vulnerabilities to an attacker, like reading and manipulating the display and keystrokes

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An Example Packet Filtering Ruleset (3)

Rule	Direction	Src. Addr.	Dest. Addr.	Protocol	Src. Port	Dest. Port	ACK	Action
A	Inbound	External	Internal	ТСР	>1023	25		Permit
В	Outbound	Internal	External	ТСР	25	>1023		Permit
С	Outbound	Internal	External	ТСР	>1023	25		Permit
D	Inbound	External	Internal	TCP	25	>1023		Permit
Е	Either	Any	Any	Any	Any	Any		Deny

- □ The flaw of ruleset 1 can be fixed in this updated ruleset 2 by including the source ports into the specification:
 - As now outbound traffic to ports >1023 is allowed only if the source port is 25 (B), traffic from internal X-clients or -servers (port >1023) will be blocked
 - The same holds for inbound traffic to ports >1023 (D)
- However, it can not be assumed for sure that an attacker will not use port 25 for his attacking X-client:
 - In this case the above filter will let the traffic pass

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An Example Packet Filtering Ruleset (4)

Rule	Direction	Src. Addr.	Dest. Addr.	Protocol	Src. Port	Dest. Port	ACK	Action
A	Inbound	External	Internal	ТСР	>1023	25	Any	Permit
В	Outbound	Internal	External	ТСР	25	>1023	Yes	Permit
С	Outbound	Internal	External	ТСР	>1023	25	Any	Permit
D	Inbound	External	Internal	ТСР	25	>1023	Yes	Permit
Е	Either	Any	Any	Any	Any	Any	Any	Deny

- This problem can be addressed in ruleset 3 by also specifying TCP's ACK-flag in rules B and D:
 - As the ACK-flag is required to be set in rule B, it is not possible to open a new TCP connection in the outbound direction to ports >1023, as TCP's connect-request has the ACK-flag not set
 - The same holds for the inbound direction, as rule D requires the ACK-flag to be set
- As a basic rule, any filtering rule that permits incoming TCP packets for outgoing connections should require the ACK-flag to be set

An Example Packet Filtering Ruleset (5)

Rule	Direction	Src. Addr.	Dest. Addr.	Protocol	Src. Port	Dest. Port	ACK	Action
A	Inbound	External	Bastion	ТСР	>1023	25	Any	Permit
В	Outbound	Bastion	External	ТСР	25	>1023	Yes	Permit
С	Outbound	Bastion	External	ТСР	>1023	25	Any	Permit
D	Inbound	External	Bastion	ТСР	25	>1023	Yes	Permit
Е	Either	Any	Any	Any	Any	Any	Any	Deny

- □ If the firewall comprises a bastion host, the packet filtering rules should further restrict traffic flow (→ screened host architecture):
 - As in the modified rules above only traffic between the Internet and the bastion host is allowed, external attackers can not attack SMTP on arbitrary internal hosts any longer
- □ In a screened subnet firewall, two packet filtering routers are set up:
 - one for traffic allowed between the Internet and the bastion host, and
 - one for traffic allowed between the bastion host and the internal network

Bastion Hosts (1)

- A bastion host is defined as a host that is more exposed to the hosts of an external network than the other hosts of the network it protects
- □ A bastion host may serve for different purposes:
 - Packet filtering
 - Providing proxy services
 - A combination of both
- The principles for building a bastion hosts are extensions of those for securing any mission critical host:
 - Keep it simple
 - Prepare for the bastion host to be compromised:
 - · Internal hosts should not trust it more than necessary
 - If possible, it should be connected in such a way to the network that it can not sniff internal traffic
 - Provide extensive logging for incident detection / analysis, if possible such that it can not be easily tampered with even when the host is compromised


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Bastion Hosts (2)

- Further guidelines:
 - Make the bastion host unattractive:
 - Slower machines are less appealing targets and are less useful if compromised
 - However, if the bastion host offers some resource consuming service, e.g. WWW-service, it may be wiser not to make it too slow
 - The fewer tools are available on the bastion host, the less useful the machine is to an attacker
 - Get a reliable hardware configuration
 - The bastion host should be placed at a physically secure location
 - Disable any user accounts on the bastion host (e.g. only administrators can login to the Bastion host)
 - Secure the system logs (e.g. by writing them directly to a printer, or using the printer port to a dedicated PC which is not networked)
 - Do regular backups of the system logs and the configuration (using a dedicated backup device)
 - Monitor the machine closely (reboots, usage / load patterns, etc.)
 - If possible, restore the machine regularly from a prepared installation

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



Proxy Services

□ Proxy:

- A program that deals with external servers on behalf of internal clients
- Proxies relay approved client requests to real servers and also relay the servers answers back to the clients
- If a proxy interprets and understands the commands of an application protocol it is called an *application level proxy* (e.g. a Web proxy),
- If it just passes the PDUs between the client and the server it is called a circuit level proxy (e.g. SOCKS proxy)
- □ Candidate services for proxying:
 - FTP, Telnet, DNS, SMTP, HTTP
- □ The use of a proxy service usually leads to the following situation:
 - The user of a proxy service has the illusion of exchanging data with the actual server host
 - The actual server has the illusion of exchanging data with the proxy host

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- Basic idea: control route propagation to the point that only certain networks receive routes for other networks
- This intends to realize "security by obscurity"
- Tunneling:
 - Generic routing encapsulation (GRE)
 - PPP / PPTP / L2TP
 - Note: PPTP was developed by Microsoft and used MS-CHAP(Microsoft Challenge-handshake Authentication Protocol) and MPPE (Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption Protocol)
 - It is currently considered as inherently insecure, since messages can be easily spoofed
 - IPSec (See examples provided in Chapter 8)
 - SSL (e.g. OpenVPN is based on SSL/TLS)
 - SSH: OpenSSH offers also (since Version 4.3) a possibility for building VPNs

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
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- Configuration at Gateway A:
 - spdadd 10.0.1.0/24 10.0.2.0/24 any -P out ipsec esp/tunnel/172.16.0.1-172.16.0.2/require ;
 - spdadd 10.0.2.0/24 10.0.1.0/24 any -P in ipsec esp/tunnel/172.16.0.2-172.16.0.1/require ;

Note

- protocol and port (any)
- the policy to use (-P) specifying direction (in/out), action (ipsec/discard/none), the protocol (ah/esp), the mode (tunnel/transport), and the level (uses/require)
- Configuration at Gateway B:
 - spdadd 10.0.2.0/24 10.0.1.0/24 any -P out ipsec esp/tunnel/172.16.0.2-172.16.0.1/require ;
 - spdadd 10.0.1.0/24 10.0.2.0/24 any -P in ipsec esp/tunnel/172.16.0.1-172.16.0.2/require ;


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 The "*forward*" chain: for processing packets that are traversing this host. If a Linux machine is used as a router, this chain will be frequently used. If a Linux machine is used as an end-host and not as a Linux router, this chain will not be used

Netfilter Chains






	[netfi08]	"Netfilter Online Documentation", http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO//packet-filtering-HOWTO.html
	[Sem96a]	C. Semeria. Internet Firewalls and Security. 3Com Technical Paper, 1996.
	• •	J. P. Wack, L.J. Carnahan. <i>Keeping Your Site Comfortably Secure: An Introduction to Internet Firewalls</i> . NIST Special Publication 800-10, 1995.
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	[SeSec08]	"SearchSecurity.com Definitions; virtual private network" http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci213324,00.html
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Native IPSec Support

□ In Linux 2.6, native support for IPSec processing is integrated with the netfilter architecture



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